Taxation Problems Relating to Patents and Other Intangible Industrial Property by Bonham, Robert G.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 30 Issue 3 Article 3 
June 2021 
Taxation Problems Relating to Patents and Other Intangible 
Industrial Property 
Robert G. Bonham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Robert G. Bonham, Taxation Problems Relating to Patents and Other Intangible Industrial Property, 30 
Dicta 100 (1953). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Mar., 1953
TAXATION PROBLEMS RELATING TO PATENTS
AND OTHER INTANGIBLE INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY
ROBERT G. BONHAM
of the Denver Bar
On the Patent Office building in Washington appears the in-
scription "The Patent System Added the Fuel of Interest to the
Fire of Genius." This famous quotation by Abraham Lincoln has
now been modified by a damper to the fire in the form of the
Internal Revenue Code. Ever since 1913, the difficulties presented
to inventors and patent holders, as well as other taxpayers, have
been increasing. I shall not attempt in this paper to explore all
the ramifications present in this damper, but shall try to point
out some of the major problems confronting the individual for-
tunate enough to be granted a patent by our Government.
When a patent is finally issued'by the Patent Office, the holder
of this official document is mainly concerned with attempting to
augment his depleted coffers by the sale, assignment or license of
the rights granted by the patent. It is very important at this
stage of the game to determine the classification of the inventor.
Is he a professional inventor who uses his inventive capacity to
provide a livelihood? Or is he an individual who has merely been
struck by the so-called "flash of genius" and has perfected his
once-in-a-lifetime invention? We can go somewhat further and
possibly allow this latter individual to secure several occasional
patents, but he must not be permitted to lose his amateur standing.
This first possibility existing for the inventor is the outright
sale of all rights granted by the patent. Although it is difficult
to determine the future value of a patent as long as the possibility
exists that it may sometime be brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court, nevertheless, we will assume that a value has
been established, and a willing buyer has been contacted and
subdued.
For our amateur inventor, no great problem exists in the
sale of his rights. He is mainly interested in establishing the
transaction as a long-term capital gain under Section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and to this end, assistance has been granted
by the courts. If the necessary holding period of 6 months has
been complied with, the courts have permitted the amateur in-
ventor to qualify the transaction as a long-term capital gain.' In
determining the period of 6 months, a starting date for the hold-
ing period is permitted as being the time of reduction to practice
of the invention,2 and not as of the date of issuance of the patent.
'Maurice Bacon Cooke et ux, 4 TCM 204; James H. Adamson, 5 TCM 1071;
Edward C. Myers, 6 TC 258; William M. Kelly, 6 TCM 646; John W. Hogg et al,
3 TCM 211; Hoffenbert v. Briggs, 84 USPQ 36.
" Diescher v. Comm. Int. Rev., 36 BTA 732.
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Our professional inventor is not in such a fortunate position
as the amateur inventor. This individual who spends all, or the
majority of his time, in the obtaining of patents is faced with
different problems. The court ruled in the case of Harold Avery :
that the sale of patents by the professional inventor resulted in
ordinary income and not a capital gain. In this case, Avery had
procured 12 patents during a 17 year period, and had sold 3 of
these patents and licensed 3 others. Although Avery had orig-
inally started his patent activities as a hobby on his spare time,
the court said:
"What may have been a hobby originally became a
trade or business when he held the patents for sale or
license to others for profit."
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has stressed this decision
in later cases, but it appears that facts will have to be present to
establish that the patents are held by an individual for sale as
part of his ordinary business transactions in order to have the
doctrine of the Avery case invoked.
In a very interesting article by Mr. Jay 0. Kramer 4 concern-
ing the sale of patents by professional inventors, the suggestion
is made that a professional inventor should retain title to his less
profitable inventions by issuing licenses, and report the royalties
received as ordinary income. The inventor is then in a position
to sell a more valuable patent and qualify such sale as a capital
gain.
If the professional inventor is unable to avoid the ruling that
the income received from the sale of his patent constitutes ordi-
nary income, then we must attempt to find some other means to
assist this inventor. Under Section 107(b), the professional in-
ventor is allowed to spread the income received over a period of
3 years provided he has worked on the invention for at least 3
years, and so long as certain provisions are complied with.
The professional inventor can also take advantage of the pro-
visions of Section 44 of the Internal Revenue Code regarding
installment sales. Here the sale involves a fixed pre-determined
price with an installment payment made each year. This allows
the income to be spread over a number of years with a resulting
tax gain.
Another method of securing relief for the professional inven-
tor is through an exchange of the patent to a corporation for
stock. This method is pointed out in an address given by Mr.
Gustave Simons 5 to the New York Patent Law Association. Here,
the exchange is a tax-free transaction, and when the stock is
eventually sold, the resulting income is a capital gain.
Before leaving the subject of the sale of a patent, let us look
' 47 BTA 538
4 31 Journal of the Patent Office Society 51.
'Tax Law of Research and Patents, 31 JPOS 574.
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for a moment at the decision in the Myers 6 case. Here, the in-
ventor granted an exclusive license to use, manufacture and sell
the invention. Payments were designated as royalties and were
to be paid annually. The licensor reserved the right to cancel the
license in the event that the royalties failed to reach a specified
yearly amount. The court held that the agreement was a sale
even though the option was present, and the inventor allowed to
treat the income as a long-term capital gain.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue does not acquiesce in this
decision and issued a statement 7 setting forth the policy of the
Bureau. Under this policy the Bureau would treat as ordinary
income all amounts received by the inventor or owner of the patent
under an assignment or a license providing for payments to be
made, (1) in amounts measured by a fixed percentage of the sell-
ing price of the article manufactured and sold, (2) in amounts
based by any other method upon production, sale or use, or, (3)
in amounts payable periodically over the period in which the
assignee or licensee uses the patent.
In spite of the statement, the tax court has followed the
Myers case and ignored the policy established in holding later
cases contra to the policy.8 In connection with the Myers case,
a study should be made of the Waterman v. Mackenzie 9 case which
involves a similar type agreement, but the right to "use" the in-
vention was omitted.
Assuming that we have established that a sale actually exists
for both our amateur and professional inventor, we are now faced
with the problem of establishing a value for the capital asset in
order that the tax can be determined.
Under Regulation 111 of the Internal Revenue Code we find
that the cost of developing patents should be capitalized. 10 This
provision relating to Research Expense will be discussed in greater
detail later in this paper. We also find under this regulation that
the following costs, when actually paid, are allowable in deter-
mining the sum to be capitalized when a patent is obtained from
the United States Government:
1. Various Government fees.
2. Development or experimental expenses.
3. Experimental models.
4. Costs of drawings.
5. Attorney's fees and similar expenses.
The provision in the regulation " provides as follows:
6 Edward C. Myers, supra.
'Mimeo. 6490-1950-1CB9.
1H. W. Taylor, 16 TC 376 (non-acq.).
9 138 US 252.
10Gilliam Mfg. Co., 1 BTA 967; Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 BTA 30; Beaumont Co.
v. Comm. Int. Rev., 3 BTA 822; Dempster Mill Mfg. Co.. v. Burnet, 46 Fed. (2d)
604.
"Regulation 111, Sec. 29.23 (1) 8.
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"If a taxpayer has incurred expenditures in his busi-
ness for designs, drawings, patterns, models, or work of
an experimental nature calculated to result in improve-
ment of his facilities or his product, and if the period
of usefulness of any such asset may be estimated from
experience with reasonable accuracy, it may be the sub-
ject of depreciation allowances spread over the estimated
period of usefulness."
Since a patent runs for a period of 17 years from the date
of issuance, depreciation is allowable over the period of life. How-
ever, the basis for computation must be established sufficiently
to allow the depreciation.' To digress for a moment, we also
find that the regulations 13 allow an obsolescent deduction for pat-
ents in the amount of the depreciated cost of that part of the
patent proved to be obsolete.' 4 This permits the unamortized value
to be charged off completely or in part to expense in any year
where circumstances create a decline in value or complete loss
of value to the patent owner. Besides obsolescence, court decisions
holding the patent invalid, court injunctions against use of the
patent, transfer of patent to an educational or other institution
in good faith will allow the unamortized value to be expensed.
Returning now to our inventor, we find from the foregoing
information that he would be required to capitalize the patent
2ost, determine the unamortized value, relate this value to the
sale price, and then determine his tax on a long-term capital
gain basis.
The majority of the preceding discussion has been related
to the sale of a patent. Now the tax problems for other methods
of handling the patent should be considered.
The most general method used by patent owners is the license
agreement. By the use of a license agreement, the patent owner
can retain control over his invention and also over improvements
to his invention. As a general rule, royalties received from patent
licenses are taxable as ordinary income under Section 22(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. 15 From the standpoint of the licensee
of the patent, the royalties are treated as a deductible business
expense.' 6
By retaining control of the patent through the use of a license
agreement, the patent owner also is subjected to the possibility
of litigation. This usually involves actions against the infringers
of the patent, which may run several years before final settlement.
If the patent holder is successful in such actions and recovers
damages from the infringer, such payments are usually regarded
as deferred income and treated as ordinary income for tax pur-
"Niagara Searchlight Co., 10 BTA 922.
" Regulation 103, Sec. 19.23(1) 7.
"Hazeltine Corp. v. Comm. Int. Rev., 89 Fed. (2d) 513.
,5 Ernest G. Hoffman, 8 BTA 1272.
" Regulation 111, Section 29.23 (a) 1.
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poses. As suggested by Mr. Charles M. Hogan 17 in an excellent
article concerning the Impact of Federal Income Taxation on
Patent Law and Practice, it is advantageous to join a count for
unfair competition and prove damage to the assets of the business.
If such damages can be established, then the money paid as com-
pensation for the injury to the asset is treated as ordinary in-
come only to the extent that it exceeds the amount of the loss to
the assets of the business.
When damages are finally recovered, the amounts should be
included in the income tax return in the year in which they are
received. Although the actual damages may have occurred sev-
eral years before, it is not until the actual final accounting is
made that the exact amount is determined.
The actual cost of the litigation against the infringers of
the patent is a deductible expense provided the litigation does not
perfect the title or prolong the life of the patent. The costs, which
include court costs and counsel fees, can be deducted in the year
incurred or at the close of the litigation proceedings. The losing
party in such litigation is allowed to deduct the amount paid on
the judgment.'8 In contrast to the allowance of these legal fees
as deductible expenses, we find the amounts expended for legal
services in connection with the prosecution of patent applications
and interference proceedings in the Patent Office are treated as
capital expenditures and not deductible expenses. 19 This is true
even though some of the patent applications did not become is-
sued patents.
The preceding discussion has mainly been directed to the field
of patents. Although many of the provisions are the same for
copyrights and trade-marks, there are certain differences in the
handling of this type of intangible property that should be pointed
out.
Copyrights, which are granted for a period of 28 years with
the right to renew for an additional 28 year period, are subject
to depreciation, and when sold; the gain or loss arising therefrom
is computed by taking the difference between the selling price and
the cost as established with proper adjustment for depreciation.
To a person in the profession of writing books or creating
other artistic works, his income from the sale of the products of
his work is taxed as ordinary income, and it matters not whether
the income is in the form of royalties or proceeds from outright
sale.
Two types of capital expenditures are found in the publica-
tion and sale of copyrighted books. In one case, the cost of pro-
ducing and copyrighting the text may be returned to the holder
through an annual allowance for depreciation, or if sold, the
adjusted basis may be deducted from the sum received in deter-
33 JPOS 531.
"Becker Bros. v. U. S., 7 Fed. (2d) 3.
19 Hazeltine Corp. v, Comm. Int. Rev., supra.
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mining the gain or loss from the sale. In the second case, where
the author publishes a book, pays all publication costs and
handles the sale of the books himself, he is allowed to allocate a
proportionate share of the cost of each book and deduct this amount
from the selling price in determining the amount to be reported
as a profit and taxed as ordinary income.
Payments for limited rights in copyrighted works such as
motion picture rights are treated as payments in the nature of
royalties and taxed as ordinary income. The fact that the pay-
ments are made in lump sums does not change their status as
royalties.2 0 Motion picture rights are classified as property held
primarily for sale rather than property used in a business, and
therefore the sale of such rights results in ordinary income.
Passing to the field of trade-marks, we find we are dealing
with property that has an indefinite duration. A trade-mark is
granted by the Patent Office for a period of 20 years, and a re-
newal can be secured for each ensuing 20 year period. The courts
have held that the inherent quality of trade-marks is such that
they are not subject to exhaustion.2 ' Other types of intangible
property such as Goodwill, trade names, newspaper subscription
lists and formulas are also not subject to a depreciation or obso-
lescent allowance because of the indefinite duration of their effec-
tive usefulness. It is only when the law makes the business worth-
less that this type of intangible property can properly be deducted
as a loss.
The legal expenses incurred in prosecuting infringers of trade-
marks are capital expenditures which are added to the cost of the
trade-mark and are not deductible expenses. *A recent case 22 held
that attorney's fees are not an allowable deduction where the fees
were incurred in litigation to defend or perfect the title to a prop-
erty right in a trade name. An amount paid to a company for
permission to use a registered trade-mark is a capital expendi-
ture and not an expense.
The problem of Research and Development Expense was
briefly mentioned before and it was pointed out that the general
rule is that these types of expenses should be capitalized. When
they are capitalized they are amortized over the useful life of the
project or over the 17 year life of the patent. If the project is
abandoned, or if the patent becomes worthless, these expenses
may then be written off in the year that such abandonment or
obsolescence occurs. An excellent paper, previously mentioned,
concerning this general problem was given by Mr. Gustave Si-
mons.
2 3
An important case2 4 pertaining to the problem of handling
:oComm. Int. Rev. v. P. G. Woodehouse, 337 U. S. 369.
-Norwich Pharmacal Co., 30 B.T.A. 326.
"Food Fair of Virginia, Inc. v. Comm. Int. Rev., 85 USPQ 518.
Supra.
'Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., 12 T.C. 101.
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research expenses concerned contributions made to a Research
Institute for vital research. The court held that these contribu-
tions were not deductible as current expenses and the following
appeared in the opinion:
It has been consistently held that expenses incurred
in the experimentation and development of patents, for-
mulas, and processes, are capital expenditures . . .
It is not determinative of the issue here that noth-
ing of a capital nature was developed during the taxable
year in question or that the particular line of research
which the Institute was following during that year subse-
quently proved fruitless. It is clearly the very nature of
an experimental project that many lines of approach
must be tried and many abandoned before results are
obtained.
Manifestly, the initial unsuccessful experiments as
well as the final successful ones would have entered into
the cost of any capital asset that had been developed.
There was no occasion for saying at the close of the tax-
able year that no capital asset would be developed and
for isolating the portion of the project sum expended by
the Institute up until that time and deducting it as a
business expense of petitioner. Clearly the project sum,
which had been paid in toto by petitioner to the Midwest
Research Institute shortly after the contract was exe-
cuted, should be treated as a unit, like the project. As
of the end of the taxable year on April 30, 1946, only
slightly more than one-third of that project sum had been
expended and only slightly more than one-fourth of the
project time had elapsed. Only when the complete proj-
ect had resulted in failure and there had been a definite
abandonment or termination would the expenditures have
been deducted, and then as a loss.
This case would seem to indicate that all research costs must
be capitalized and that it is impossible to claim current expense
deductions for these costs. This, however, is not the case, as the
Bureau of Internal Revenue allows such expenses to be deducted
as current expenses. The taxpayer, in order to qualify for such
treatment, must follow a consistent practice in the handling of
these expenses, and the amount spent in research must be ap-
proximately the same each year. This, of course, places a burden
on new companies and also on small companies where the research
expenses will vary widely from year to year.
The present policy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
excellently stated in an article written by Mr. J. Keith Butters. -.
"By and large, the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its
actual treatment of the handling of research and develop-
= Taxation and New Product Dcvelopment, Harvard Business Review, Sum-
mer 1945, p. 451.
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ment expenditures has been much more liberal than the
Treasury regulations would indicate and has generally
permitted such expenditures to be deducted as current
charges against net income.
The policy of the Bureau appears to be roughly as
follows: If a firm spends approximately the same amount
on research and development work year after year and
consistently claims these expenditures as deductions from
current income, it seldom has substantial amounts of its
claims disallowed. On the other hand, if the amounts spent
on research and development fluctuate widely from year
to year and if the taxpayer does not follow a consistent
accounting practice, the Bureau quite naturally tends to
be more critical.
This policy sometimes results in a less favorable
treatment for small, and also for new, companies than
for large, established companies. The research expendi-
tures of a small company operating in a field where re-
search is important are likely to fluctuate more widely
than those of a large company, and hence to be questioned
more closely by the Bureau. A new company will fre-
quently establish a precedent of capitalizing research and
development expenditures in its early years in order to
avoid reporting heavy losses and to make the best possi-
ble showing on its balance sheets. Such a precedent may
later prove very damaging, but once it is established great
difficulty is likely to be encountered in reversing it.
From the above, it can be seen that the Bureau is still fol-
lowing in practice the old provisions of the regulation which
allowed the taxpayer to elect either a deduction for the research
expenses in the year incurred or to treat the expenses as a capital
asset. It must be recognized that a serious challenge from the
Bureau to the present operating practice of a concern will prob-
ably result in the expenditures being capitalized.
In closing, it can be readily seen that the taxation problems
involving intangible property are many and varied. It is only
through the close cooperation of the legal profession and the ac-
counting profession that the proper solutions may be uncovered,
and the interests of the owner of such property be fully protected.
ON THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
In the Matter of the Estate of John Joseph Jacobs, No. 60051,
Judge Brofman ruled that, in the absence of language in the will
to the contrary, a fiduciary may make investments under the
"prudent man rule," Chap. 297, L. 1951 (Section 126, Chap. 176,
'35 C.S.A.), notwithstanding the fact that the preparation of the
instrument and the death of the testator were prior to the enact-
ment date of the legislation adopting the "prudent man rule."
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